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in American Health Law
By M. Gregg Bloche
Professor Bloche's work on tiis article
was supported in part by an Investigator
Award in Health Policy Research from
the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.
uring the 1960s and 1 970s, the indi-
vidual rights revolution that swept
through American society remade
much of the nation's health law in its
image. Sick people acquired the right to be
told of the risks and benefits of proposed
treatments and then to give thumbs-up or
thumbs-down to their doctors' decisions.
Successful suits for medical negligence
went from rare to commonplace. Elderly
and poor Americans achieved statutory
rights of access to publicly funded health-
care, and courts burnished these rights
with myriad procedural protections. The
critically ill and their families won the right
to refuse aggressive, life-sustaining treat-
ments. Psychiatric patients acquired new
veto power over hospital confinement and
drug therapy, and biomedical research
subjects gained myriad safeguards ground-
ed in the principle of informed consent.
By the early 1980s, the law governing
American medicine embodied, in form if
not in practice, the ideal of the individ-
ual as author of his or her own clinical
fate. This ideal portrayed patients as sov-
ereign clinical consumers, entitled to
make decisions about their care without
regard for the financial consequences
borne by others. So long as the assorted
others-mainly employer-sponsored
health insurance plans and taxpayer-
supported federal and state programs-
paid more or less uncomplainingly, this
ideal seemed immune to challenge. It
appealed, diversely, to liberal propo-
nents of the individual rights revolution
and to conservatives inclined toward
pursuit of efficiency through deference
to consumer choice. It disregarded the
fact that consumers of healthcare often
do not pay for what they choose.
Today, the paradigm of personal
choice in medical matters is under assault
from several directions. Pressed by taxpay-
ers and cost-sensitive employers, public
and private healthcare payers no longer
finance individual choice uncomplaining-
ly. Medicare, Medicaid, and employer-
sponsored health plans pursue
management strategies designed to dis-
courage high-cost consumer choices. Sub-
scribers to HMOs and other managed care
plans face an array of financial incentives,
bureaucratic barriers, and contractual lim-
itations that constrain access to treatment
options, alternative providers, and infor-
mation about risks and benefits. Federal
preemption of state tort and contract law
applicable to employer-provided health
benefits shields many of these constraints
against legal challenge. Tort reform pro-
posals pending in a number of states
would reduce the scope of healthcare
providers' potential liability for failure to
obtain informed consent, and proposed
changes in state mental health law would
diminish the ability of patients with
impaired judgment to refuse hospital con-
finement and treatment.
More surprisingly, perhaps, skepticism
about the primacy of individual rights in
the medical sphere has grown among
advocates for the health of the disadvan-
taged. In response to mounting epidemio-
logical evidence that personal health is
more closely tied to social status, income
level, race, education, and environmental
exposure than to per capita medical
spending, some advocates for the disad-
vantaged have questioned the wisdom of
public spending on healthcare programs
that aspire to emulate the individual
choice enjoyed by well-insured, fee-for-
service patients. Balanced against the ben-
efits of spending on education, economic
development, and other health-promoting
public programs, the benefits of achieving
1970s ideals of personal choice in medical
programs for the poor seem, to them,
worth forgoing. Tightly-managed HMOs
and other prepaid plans, some suggest,
may achieve more on the health promo-
tion front ( e.g., through systematic marn-
mography and blood pressure screening,
physical fitness, and health education pro-
grams) than classic fee-for-service cover-
age, while providing almost the same
therapeutic benefits, at lower cost. Benefi-
ciaries lose a measure of personal freedom
when they become ill, but this loss is more
than made up by directing the savings to
more cost-effective social programs.
This line of thinking is also gaining sup-
port abroad. Advocates of an international
human right to health increasingly stress
the socioeconomic determinants of health,
including education, income, social peace,
and respect for civil and political rights.
India, South Africa, and other "third world"
democracies are experimenting with the
HMO model as a means of making com-
prehensive, basic medical care available to
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the poor at a feasible cost. Sacrificing a
measure of personal choice to universalize
access to basic health services has much
appeal, as a matter of equity, in impover-
ished societies where rudimentary medical
care is unavailable to millions.
These misgivings about the priority of
personal choice in health policy fit awk-
wardly with the priority of patient auton-
omy in American health law and in the
growing body of international ethical
and legal norms bearing upon personal
rights in the medical setting. Put simply,
American law, international codes of
medical ethics, and such legal sources
as the Nuremberg Tribunal, European
and other regional human rights com-
missions, and the Uniled Nations reflect
the principle that sick patients should be
told the risks and benefits of clinical
alternatives and then be allowed to
make their own choices from among
them. To the extent that managed health
plans and assorted efficiency-oriented
health promotion programs pursue sav-
ings by foreclosing alternatives (and/or
by denying patients information about
them), such programs challenge govern-
ing ideals of patient autonomy.
Proponents of the managed care revo-
lution in the United States have sought to
finesse this dilemma by construing the act
of subscribing to a managed health plan
as anticipatory consent-giving (before the
onset of medical need) to the plan's bun-
die of choice-reducing policies. This strat-
egy seeks to rescue the paradigm of
personal autonomy by relocating disclo-
sure and consent from the bedside to the
employee benefits office, or wherever else
people sign up for health plans. Its propo-
nents contend that this approach respects
autonomy by allowing consumers to bring
their diverse personal preferences to bear
on choices between health plans with dif-
ferent economizing policies.
This assumes that competing health
plans explain their distinctive cost-benefit
trade-off policies (and constraints on
patient choice) to consumers and that
consumers have access to a diverse range
of plans. The reality of today's medical
marketplace falls far short in this regard. In
their promotional campaigns and con-
tracts with subscribers, health plans typi-
cally reveal little about their cost-benefit
trade-off strategies, relying instead on
opaque promises to cover "medically nec-
essary" care. To their credit, health plans
have become more lucid in their descrip-
tions of preauthorization requirements, in-
network/out-of-network coverage
differentials, and the like. But they usually
disclose little about their clinical decision
protocols, financial incentives to providers
to limit care, and other management prac-
tices that shape sick subscribers' options.
Moreover, most employers offer only
one or a few subsidized group plans,
leaving employees with the "choice"
between these and the often prohibitive
cost of purchasing Unsubsidized individ-
ual insurance. Employers that do not offer
health benefits leave their workers with
only the latter option. Likewise, public
programs for the poor, principally Medic-
aid in the United States, typically offer
few, if any, options when they channel
beneficiaries to managed care plans.
"Third world" experiments with HMOs
for the poor, in India and elsewhere, have
tended to suffer from the same defect.
Some of managed care's more exu-
berant defenders dismiss these concerns,
claiming that plan disclosures about their
cost-benefit trade-off policies are ade-
quate, that employers offering only one
or a few subsidized plans act as employ-
ee purchasing agents (and thereby give
surrogate consent) when selecting from
among many alternatives, and that con-
straints on choice in Medicaid and other
public programs are legitimated by col-
lective, political consent. Others favor-
ably inclined toward the managed care
model take these concerns seriously but
insist that markets can adequately
address them. They urge health plan
managers to reveal more about their cost-
benefit trade-off policies, and they advise
employee benefits managers and admin-
istrators of government programs to insist
on such disclosure and to offer wider
menus of alternative plans.
Government action holds out the poten-
tial to spur such change. Courts and regula-
tors could tie the acceptability of limits on
clinical alternatives more closely to the clar-
ity and specificity of health plan disclosures
to subscribers about their cost-benefit trade-
off policies. In the current political environ-
ment, federal intervention to require
employers to offer diverse menus of health
plans is unlikely, but tax and other incen-
tives for voluntary expansion of employees'
health plan options are a possibility, and
health coverage purchasing cooperatives
could extend such choice to small business-
es and independent subscribers. Political
support for broadening the coverage
options available to Medicaid managed
care subscribers is problematic, but advo-
cates for the disadvantaged might do better
to focus on this objective (and on the need
for sufficient subsidies to "mainstream"
Medicaid beneficiaries into plans with
many working class subscribers) than to
oppose managed care for the poor outright.
Yet, such developments can at best
reduce, not eliminate, the tension
between the 1960s and 1970s ideals of
individual autonomy embodied in
American health law and 1990s thinking
about efficient allocation of resources to
maximize the health of populations. The
paradigm of informed consent to med-
ical intervention that lies at the core of
American health law privileges a sick
patient's preferences at the moment of
medical decision over his or her econo-
mizing preferences at the time of health
plan enrollment-and over achieving
the biggest "bang for the buck" when
devoting social resources to health.
From a population-oriented perspec-
tive, this is plainly inefficient. Indeed,
growing evidence suggests that much of
our response to individual medical need
is inefficient, in aggregate health terms,
when compared to equivalent spending
on education and job training, environ-
mental protection, and other health-relat-
ed social needs. Yet, we are hardly ready,
as a society, to ignore individual clinical
need, or to give up our empathy and ethi-
cal regard for the fears, distress, and hopes
of the sick when medical decisions loom.
To the contrary, most of us would not
want to live in a society that required us
always to disregard our private worries
and emotional ties in deference to the
greatest good for the greatest number. In
the years ahead, Amerkan health law will
need to mediate this central tension,
between our intimate and public selves,
between compassion and calculation,
and between rights and efficiency.
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